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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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STATE OF UTAH
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Bl~IEF
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This appeal involves two separate trials, one prilnaril~? bet,Yeen Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., plaintiffs
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inafter referred to as Canal) and the other primarily
between Canal Insurance Company and Under,vriters
at Lloyds, London (hereinafter referred to as Lloyds).
1

When Dia1nond T Utah, Inc., et al, sued ·Canal under
a physical damage insurance policy issued by Canal to
Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., Canal filed a Third Party
Complaint against Lloyds claiming that if Canal "\Yere
liable, Lloyds would be liable for 75 per cent of the
liability of Canal by virtue of a reinsurance certificate
issued by Lloyds to Canal.
Trial was held first in the case of Diamond T Utah,
Inc., et al., against Canal and resulted in a judgment
against ·Canal. Follov.ring this, trial "\Yas had in the case
of Canal against Lloyds and resulted in a judgment
in favor of Canal and against Lloyds. This appeal "\Yas
taken by Lloyds fron1 both judgments.
Since the record pagination does not include the
supplemental transcript, references herein to the record
are designated "R. ~' and to the supplen1ental transcript,

"T ."
STATEJ\IIENT OF FACTS
On !\larch 3, 1959, Dirunond T Utah, Inc., a lTtah
corporation, and Shern1an N. Drain and John ..._\. Drain,
doing business as D &

' T Transport brought an action
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
in the Dstrict Court of Salt Lake County against Canal
clain1ing that on or about April 7, 1958, Canal issued
an insurance policy insuring a motor vehicle for one
year fro1n that date and that by this policy ·Canal agreed
to pay the cost of any damage to said motor vehicle
less $250. Plaintiffs claimed that on June 30, 1958, the
vehicle was demolished in a road collision resulting in
damage of $13,000.
Canal later filed a motion for permission to file a
Third Party Complaint against Lloyds. This motion was
granted on April 28, 1959.
On

~fay

4, 1959, Canal served its Ans\ver and Third

Party Complaint upon Dian1ond T Utah, Inc., et al.,
alleging that the Co1nplaint failed to state a claim upon
w·hich relief could be granted, that there was a defect
in parties plaintiff in that Utah Savings and Trust
Co1npany \Yas not nan1ed a party and that the policy

was cancelled effective l\{ay 2±, 1958. The Third Party
Complaint alleged that on April 7, 1958, Lloyds issued
to ·Canal a reinsurance certificate, No. AM 0165-93, by
the terms of \Vhich Lloyds agreed to reinsure 75 p·er
cent of the risk assumed by Canal under its policy in
favor of Diamond T Utah and the Drains, and sought
recovery against Lloyds of 75 per cent of any amounts
found to be due Diamond T or the Drains from Canal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On June 15, 1959, Lloyds served its Answer to
the Third Party Complaint alleging that the Complaint
failed to state a claim contemplated by Rule 14-, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that any reinsurance certificate issued by Lloyds to Canal was cancelled prior
to the alleged loss.
On July 29, 1959, Dian1ond T lJtah, Inc., a Utah
corporation, Sherman N. Drain and John A. Drain,
doing business as D & W Transport and Zion's First
National Bank, formerly Utah Savings and Trust ·Company, a lTtah corporation, served their An1ended ·Complaint upon Canal Insurance Company w·hereby said
Zion's First National Bank 'vas made an additional party
plaintiff.
On August 11, 1959, Canal Insurance Con1pany filed
an Answer to the Amended Complaint relying essentially upon the sa1ne defenses set forth in its

Ans"~er

to the original Co1nplaint.
On October 29, 1959, a pretrial hearing
during 'vhich it 'yas agreed that the claiin

,\~as

held

bet"~een

Dia1nond T and others and ·Canal ,yould be tried before
the rlailn bet\\~ren ·Canal and Lloyds. It 'vas stipulated
that the policy· refPrred to in the pleadings had been
iRHnPrl and rould be received in eYidence at the tin10 of
trial. The

iH~nes "~rre

agreed to be:
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1. Whether or not the insurance policy in
question \vas in force and effect on the date of
the loss, to wit: June 30, 1958.
2. The amount of damage suffered by the
plain tiffs.
The position of Canal was stated as foll·o\vs:
"The position of the Defendant is that the
policy had been cancelled at a time prior to the
loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in
accordance 'vith the provisions of the policy."
(R. 41)
No clain1 of reinstatement or estoppel was made
and no discussion of those subjects had at the pretrial
(R. 40-42).
Trial of the claim between Diamond T Utah, Inc.,
et al., and Canal 'vas held February 25, 1960, before
the IIonorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge, and
the following evidence produced.
On :J[arch 29, 1957, Sher1nan N. Drain and John
A. Drain, doing business as D & W Transport, entered
into a Conditional Sale Contract with Diamond T Utah,
Inc., for the purchase of a 1955 \\"'"hite Freightliner
tractor (Ex. 7). This contract 'vas then sold to Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Savings & Trust, \vlrich subsequently became Zion's First
National Bank, with the provision that Diamond T 'vas
to repurchase the contract in the event the payments
fro1n D & \'/ Transport became more than sixty days
past due (T. 93). The contract 'vas repurchased from
Zion's First National Bank by Diamond T about July
25, 1958 (T. 93).
On April 7, 1958, Mr. Roy G. James, an agent of
Farmers Insurance Group (T. 83) acting for D & \V.
Transport, placed an automobile insurance policy, No.
A-77765, covering physical damage to the White tractor,
through the Benson Company with Canal. (Ex. 1, T.
11, 12). A down payment on this policy 'vas 1uade by
James in the amo1mt of $161.70 on that date and the
remainder of the pre1uium was to be paid by the insured,
Sherman N. Drain and John A. Drain, in n1onthly p(1yments (T. 106).
On April 18, 1958, at the request of J a1nes, ·Canal,
through Surplus Line ·Con1pany, "~rote an automobile
lia.bili t~~ policy (Ex. 6), insuring the Drains against
public liabilit~~ arising out of the operation of the
\Vhite tractor. I-Iowever, since no do,vn pay1uent ,yas
1nade and no payn1ent reePived Surplus Line retained
the policy in its office (T. 13). Son1e tinu• after .A.pril
18, 1958 and prior to

l\[a~~

14, 1958, Canal directed

Rurplus Line to secure full liability·

coYerar-:e

on the

])rain account or h.•r1ninate t1H• risk (T. 15). Ja1nes
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report Pd that there was no possibility of getting full
liability covl)rage since the Drains had a portion of
their coverage furnished by the parties with whom they
contracted ( T. 34).
The monthly premium on the physical damage policy
due l\[ay 7, 1958 was not paid. On May 14, 1958, a
notice of cancellation was prepared by Surplus Line
(Ex. 2) and on that date, after being properly stamp·ed,
copies of such notice were mailed to James, to the
insured, Sherman N. Drain, to the loss-payee, Utah
Savings & Trust, and to Canal (T. 60). Although the
policy provided that ten days notice would· ·be given
on cancellation by the company (Ex. 1), the cancellation notiee provided that cancellation would be effective
at the expiraton of five days.
Sherman Drain, testifying on behalf of D & W
Transport, and Grant Bryan, testifying on behalf of
Zion's First National Bank, successor to Utah Savings
& Loan, denied receipt of the notice of cancellation. This
notice ''Tas the only notice ever prepared or sent by
~urplus Line to Drain, James and Utah Savings &
Loan or any of them ( T. 30, 31, 61, 63).
Canal ackno\\Tledged recepit of the notice of cancellation on June 19~ 1958 (Ex. +). J a1nes tPlephoned Surplus Line Company and stated that Drain had received
notice of c-ancellation (T. 21) and, in a statement taken
.August 11, 1938, said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
"Sherman Drain brought this cancellation in
to me on l\fay 28th. I don't know what day it was
received. It was my understanding this cancellation was to become effective on May 24th." (T.
112).
On July 1, 1958, James wrote to Mr. Stephen N etolicky,
Manager of Surplus Line, acknowledging that he had
received written cancellation of the D & W Transport
policy (Ex. 3).

-. On June 4, 1958, H. F. Benson, Jr., of Surplus
Line advised Canal that Policy No. A-77765 had been
cancelled, effective May 24, 1958. On June 6, 1958, Netolicky received from James a check in the amount of
$181.04 (Ex. 11) on the D & \\T Transport account (Ex.

5 ).
Prior to receipt of this check, N etolicky told J an1es that
even if James were to send the money in, the policy
could not be reinstated because Canal 'Yould not stay on
the risk (T. 34).
Thereafter, on June 30, 1958, the 1955

'\~bite

tractor,

described in ·Canal Insurance Poliry K o. A-77765, "~as
involved in an accident resulting in dan1ages in the
agrePd

UlllOUllt

of $10,:250

(':r. 3).
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After the trial on April 14, 1960, Judge J eppeson
1nade and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Jja\\T, finding:
""1±.

That the aforesaid insurance policy was
in full foree and effect at the time of the accident,
and had not been cancelled prior thereto;" (R.76)
From these facts, the Court concluded that Canal
owed Diamond T $10,000 plus interest and costs, and
on April 20, 1960, the Court made and entered its judgment against Canal in that amount (R. 73, 76).
On April 19, 1960, a pretrial hearing was held in
connection \\ith the claim of Canal against Lloyds and
the ease ~Pt for trial on !iay 16, 1960. It was agreed
that Canal and Lloyds would present the case upon
a \YTitten Stipulation of Facts.
On April 23, 1960, ·Canal served a Motion for New
Trial pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, contending that the evidence was
insufficient to justfy the verdict,

t~1at

the judgment was

against law and that error in law occurred at the trial.
Thi~

1notion "\vas filed .A.pril

~3,

1960 (R. 80).

On . :\ pril 23, 1960, Lloyds served and filed its

~lotion

for Xe\\'" Trial upon the same grounds (R. 81, 82). At
the hearing upon the l\[otion for X e\v Trial, the Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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made a more detailed statement of the findings and
having so· amended its Findings denied the Motions for
New Trial on May 10, 1960. The amendment to the
Findings was :
"14.-A. That the testimony of the witness,
Mrs. Sandra Redding, that she mailed the Notices of Cancellation to the named insured, and
the loss payee named on the ·Canal Insurance
Policy is true, and that said witness did, in fact,
mail said notices, as testified by her." (R. 86, 87).
The Court, however found that the primary reason
for cancellation of the policy by Canal \Vas nonpayment
of premiums and that premiums were received after
cancellation of the policy and retained by Canal's agent
and deposited to the account of Canal. Further, the
Court found that Canal never returned the premiums
and that the plaintiffs "~ere ju~ified in belieYing- that
the insurance \vas in force and
''That the Defendant is estopped fron1 clain1ing that the notices "Tere mailed, and from claiming that the insurance policy \\~as cancelled.'' (R.
87).
Diamond T Utah, Inc., et nl., \Yas then granted
p0r1nission to an1end the Pretrial OrdPr and file a
Reply to alleg·r P~toppel to conforn1 to the proof ad1nitted
in the ea~P (R. S7).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On nfay 31, 1960, Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., served
a Reply to the Answer of Canal and alleged:
"That Defendant and Third Party Defendant
are estopped from claiming that notices of cancellation were mailed to the Plaintiffs herein,
and are estopped from alleging that the policy
of insurance, referred to in paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's ·Con1plaint was cancelled and was not in
force and effect on the 30th day of June, 1958,
for the reason and on the grounds that said Defendant, Canal Insurance Company, through its
agent, Surplus Line Company, accepted premiums on said p·olicy subsequent to the claime·d cancellation, and that said premiums were retained
by it and were never returned or offered to be
returned to Plaintiffs." (R. 97).
This reply "\vas filed on June 1, 1960.
On l\1ay 23, 1960, trial of the issues between Canal
and Lloyds "\vas had before the Honorable Aldon J .
.A.nderson, District Judge, upon the following Stipulation of Facts :
'' 1. That Third Party Plaintiff, Canal Insurance Company, is now, and was at all times
herein mentioned, a corporation organized and
existing under and by virtue of the la,vs of the
State of South Carolina, and is now, and was at
all ti1nes herein mentioned, regularly qualified
to engage in and actually engaged, in the insurance
business in the State of Utah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. That Third Party Defendants are now,
and were at all times herein mentioned, engaged
in 'vriting various lines of insurance risks in the
United States of America, and elsewhere, including reinsurance, on policies of insurance issued
by various American companies.
3. ·That at all times herein n1entioned, The
Benson ~company was the representative of Third
Party Defendants in Salt Lake City, authorized
to solicit and issue policies of insurance of various types, and for and on behalf of Third Party
Defendants.
4. That on and prior to the 8th day of April,
1958, The Benson Company was the agent of
Third Party Plaintiff, Canal Insurance Company,
with authority to solicit and to issue policies of
Insurance 'vritten in the Canal Insurance Company.

4A. That from and after April 9, 1958, H.
F. Benson Jr., doing business as Surplus Lines
Co1npany '';-as the agent of Third Party Plaintiff,
Canal Insurance Con1pany, "\Yith authority to
solicit and to issue policies of insurance "\vritten
in the Canal Insurance Company.
5. That during the tin1e that it/he "\Yas agent
for Canal Insurance (~on1pany, H. F. Benson, Jr.,
had an oral understanding or agree1nent 'vith
Canal Insurance ·Con1pany~ that he "\Yould reinsure all policies of physical drunage insurance
'vith 1Tnder'\vriters of Lloyds, London~ to the extent of not less than 75 per cent of the entire
a1nount of tl1P risk.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Third Party Defendant denies that this fact
is in any ,,~ay binding upon it or admissable as
evidence against it in this case.
6. That there "\Yas no agreement bet\veen
Third Party Defendant and any other person or
party that Third Party Defendant, through its
reprPsentatives, vv~ould not cancel any policy of
reinsurance issued 1,~T such representatives.
7. That on or about the 7th day of April,
1958, 'Third Party Plaintiff issued to the Plaintiffs herein, Shennan N. Drain and John A.
Drain, dba D & W Transport, a policy of insurance designated as No. A-77765. That the aforesaid policy of insurance afforded coverage for
collision or up-set of a certain 1955 'Vhite Truck
therein design a ted.
8. That on or about the 7th day of April,
1938, Third Party Defendants issued to Third
Party Plaintiff, their certificate of reinsurance
No. AM 0165-93, a copy of which is hereunto
annexed, and by this reference made a part hereof. That by the terms of said certificate of reinsurance, Third Party Defendants agreed to reinsure to the extent of 75 per cent the risks insured by Third Party Plaintiff under its policy
of insurance No. A-77765.
9. That on or about the 2nd day of :Jiay,
1958, Third Party Plaintiff requested and directed
H. F. Benson, Jr. to cancel the aforesaid Policy
No.
A-77765.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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10. That on or about the 4th day of June,
1958 H. F. Benson Jr., advised Third Party
Plaintiff by letter that Policy No. A-77765 had
been cancelled, effective l\Iay 24, 1958.
11. That on June 19, 1958, Third Party Plaintiff received at its home office in Greenville, South
Carolina, a paper designated as No. 64, General
·Change Endorsement, a copy of which is hereunto
annexed, and by this reference made a part hereof.
12. That on the 26th day of June, 1958, Third
Party Plaintiff "rrote to H. F. Benson, Jr., doing
business as Surplus Line Company, a letter acknowledging receipt of the aforesaid General
Change Endorse1nen in the following language:
Gentlemen:
We are in recept of endorsement \Yhich
terminates reinsurance certificate A1\I 0165-93
for the above risk."
13. That on or about the 30th day of June,
1958, the truck described in Third Party Plaintiff's Policy No. A-77765 \Yas involved in an
accident as a result of \vhich it \Yas substantially
damaged.
1+. That the insureds, under said Policy Xo.
A-77765 together with the loss payee and their
successors in interest, connnenced an action
against Third l>arty Plaintiff in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, to recover da1nages for the
truck aforesaid.
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1 :>.

That said action ca1ne regularly on for
trial before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on
the ~5th day of Febn1ary, 1960, 'vhich resulted
in a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs therein,
and against Third Party Plaintiff in the amount
of $10,000, plus costs of court, and interest." (R.
101-105).
The following amendment to the Stipulation 'vas
n1ade at the trial :
"l\Ir. Harold Christensen: It is stipulated by
and between counsel for the parties that with the
paper designated as No. 64, General Change Endowment, referred to in paragraph 11 of the
Stipulation of Facts, was a credit memorandum in
form, Exhibit 1, attached to the Stipulation of
Facts, and that in the accounting between Canal
Insurance Company and the Surplus Line Company, no credit for the an1ount shown on Exhibit
1 was at any time claimed or taken by Canal
Insurance.
l\1:r. Ra~r ·Christensen: Canal will so stipulate." (R. 89).
The certificate of reinsurance issued by The Ben~on Cornpany for Lloyds insured Canal to the extent of
73 pPr cPnt of 100 per cent of its liability under its
Policy No. A-77765.
Relative to cancellation, the reinsurance certificate
provided:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''·Cancellation: This certificate 1nay be cancelled by the Assured at any time on the custon1ary short rate basis by giving notice in \Vriting
or surrendering this certificate, to THE BENSOl~
CO~fP ANY. This certficate may also be cancelled by U~DER\VRITERS, or by THE BENSO~~
CO:JIPANY on their behalf, "ith or without
tender of unearned pre1niun1, by giving ten (10)
days notice in writing to Assured at his last
knO"\V11 address, and stating therein the effective
date of such cancellation. In event of such cancellation by lJNDERWITERS, or by TI-IE BENSON COl\fPANY, on their behalf, UNDERvVRITERS shall refund the premium paid, less
the earned part thereof upon demand, ahvays
subject to retention by lTKDER'\rRITERS of any
n1inimum pre1nium stipulated herein; such premium adjustment to be on a pro rata basis." (R.
104).
The General Change EndorseLlent~ effective ~lay
2·1-. 1958, referred to in paragraph 11 of the foregoing

stipnlation of Facts as Exhibit 1 provided:
"It is agreed that as of the effect1Ye date
hereof, the policy is a1nended in the f.ollo"Ting particulars. In consideration of a return pre1nit11i1
of $418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax this certifieate ter1ninated in conjunction "~ith oYerla:.-ing
Canal policy." ( R. 104).
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The statement of account referred to in the General
Change Endorse1nent sho,ved a net credit to Canal of
$~~Hi.S-!-

representing $418.08 less the co1nmission plus

tllP reinsurance tax.

The Court concluded fro1n these facts that the (}eneral Change Endorsen1ent did not cancel reinsurance
certificate I\ o.

A~I

0165-93 prior to the accident and

that Canal was entitled to judgment against Lloyds in
the su1n of $7,500 and eosts. Judgment was entered
against Lloyds in that amount on

~fay

24, 1960 by

Judge Anderson.
Lloyds filed Notice of Appeal fron1 both judgraents
on J nne 3, 1960.
STATEl\iENT OF POINTS
POINT I
T!IE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENIT TO SUPPORT
TilE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF DIAMOND T UTA.I-I, Il'-TC.y
AND AGAINST CANAL.
POINT II
CANAL'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED.
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A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., TO AMEND ITS
PLEADINGS AFTER JUDGMENT.

B.

THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING
CERTAIN EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL.
POINT III

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF CANAL AND AGAINST
LLO·YDS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF DIAMOND T UTAH, INC.,
AND AGAINST CANAL.

The trial court based its judgn1ent in favor of
Dian1·ond T upon a finding 1nade at the ti1ne of Canal's
~[otion for N e\\'" Trial that:

"14-A. ·That the testilnonv of the \Yitness,
~Irs. Sandra Redding, that she 1nailed the Notices
of Cancellation to the na1ned insured and to the
loss payee na1ned on the Canal Insurance Policy.
is true, and that said \vitness did, in fact, 1nail said
notices, as testified by her.
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The C·ourt further finds that the Defendant is
estopped from claiming that the notices 'vere
mailed, and from clain1ing that the insurance
policy was cancelled.
The Plaintiff is granted per1nission to arnend
the pretrial order and file a reply in order to
allege estoppel, to conform to the proof admitted
in this case." (R. 86, 87).
The theory of estoppel, upon which this judg1nent
rests is inconsistent with the evidence and theory advanced by Diamond T at trial. To establish an estoppel,
Plaintiffs must prove that they had no knowledge of
the true facts and reasonably relied on Canal's activities
to their detriment. Migliacco v. Davis, 120 Utah 1,
23:2 P. 2d 195 (1951). The trial court apparently reasoned
that the fact that the agent of Canal accepted the payments after Notice of Cancellation caused Dia1nond T
and Drain to reasonably believe the cancellation 'vas
vacated and, in reliance upon such belief, that Diamond
T and Drain failed to procure other insurance. The error
here, of course, is that plaintiffs' entire theory and
evidence rested upon the premise that they had no
knowledge of the cancellation since they contended the
Xotice of Cancellation was never sent or received, a
position totally inconsistent 'vith the Court's finding of
estoppel. Counsel for Plaintiffs stated his position for
the trial court :
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"Mr. Wilkinson: We take issue as to the
mailing of any notice. We claim they 'vere not
mailed.
The Court: They were not mailed
Mr. Wilkinson: Yes, no notices were received . . ." ( T. 5) .
Further, plaintiffs' counsel contended that the acceptance of the payment by Canal's agent constituted
proof that no notice was actually mailed (T. 6). On
direct examination, Sherman N. Drain testified:

'' Q. Did you ever receive a notice of cancellation~

A.

No, sir I did not.

Q.

On any of the policies

involved~

fi,C

it.~

A.

No, sir, I never received any eancellation." ( T. 78, 79).

* * *
"Q. You had no notice fro1n anyone concerning

cancellation~

A.

No, sir." (T. 79).
Mr. Grant G. Bryan, representing plaintiff Zion's First
National Bank, said:
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"Q. I show you "\vhat has been marked
Exhibit 2, and I will ask you if you ever received
a cancellation notice, \vhich that would be a copy
of, cancelling the policy \vhich has been marked
Exhibit 1, which you have~
A. No, sir, I do not recall rece1v1ng anything like that.
Q. Did you receive any kind of a cancellation
notice on that policy~

A.

No, sir.

Q. Did you receive any notice by telephone
or other"\vise, to the effect that the policy had been
cancelled~

A.

No, sir." (T. 93).

The \vitness J an1es reaffirmed the theory that notice

of cancellation had never been given. He stated:

"'Q. I sho"\v you what has been marked Exhibit 2 \vhich purports to be a notice of cancellation of insurance policy, and I will ask you if
you ever received a notice that "\vould be a copy
of.
A. l don't recall receiving this type of notice
in connection "Tith this policy.
of Sponsored
cancellation
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Q.

Did you say you did not receive that type

notice~

A. Yes, I can say I did not receive this type
notice." (T. 102).
Plaintiffs are bound by the facts adduced at trial.
It is inconceivable that these facts could give rise to an
estoppel, which must be based upon the facts found.
Skeen v. Van Sickle, 80 Utah 419, 15 P.2d 34-± (1932).
Since plaintiffs claimed and testified that they never
received notice of cancellation and that they did not
know such notice had been given, they could not possibly
have relied on the acceptance of the payment to invalidate
and set aside that notice.
The court's finding that Canal is estopped from
claiming that notice of cancellation \Yas 1nailed and the
policy thereby cancelled is directly contrary to plaintiffs'
o"\vn evidence and the la\v and should be reversed.
The only issue presented by the evidence ''Tas
\vhether notice "Tas given as provided in the policy and
on this issue the evidence established and the trial court
found that notice of cancellation had been givPn in accordance \vith the ter1ns of the policy (T. 86, 87). In
vie\\T of this finding, the conelusion is inescapable that
the

(~anal

policy \Yas cancelled prior to the loss giving

rise to the clabu involved in this case.
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Paragraph 13 of the policy conditions provided:
'~

. . . this poiicy may be cancelled by the
Company by mailing to the insured at tlH~ address
sho,vn in this policy, written notice stating 'vhen
not less than 10 days thereafer such cancellation
shall be effective. The mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The time
of the surrender or the effective date and hour
of cancellation stated in the notice shall become
the end of the policy period. Delivery of such
written notice, either by the insured or by the
'Company shall be equivalent to mailing." (Ex. 1).
As indicated, the only contention made by plaintiffs
hefore and during the trial of this case was that notice
of cancellation 'vas not received by the persons entitled
to notice and hence such notice was probably not mailed.
It is 'vell settled that receipt of notice of cancellation
is immaterial where the policy provides that notice shall
be effrctive upon mailing.
"The cancellation notice here complies in all
respects 'vith the requirements of the policy, so
that, if properly addressed, its mailing effectively
cancelled the insurance coverage as of the date
specified in the notice. This is true whether or
not the assured actually received the notice and
despite
the fact he had not then received the
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refund of the unearned premium." Reddrick v.
State Capitol Insurance Company, (4 Cir., 1959)
271 F.2d 641. See also State Farm Mutual Automob~le lnstttrance Company v. Cheney, (10 Cir.,
1959) 272 F .2d 20.
Although the notice rn this case provided that it
would be effective five days from mailing, the policy provided that the insured \vas entitled to ten days after
mailing. In such a situation, the notice is construed
as operative in accordance \vith the terms of the policy:
''If a notice provides that it shall be effective
at once, instead of at the end of the stipulated
notice, it is not void, but will be construed as
though it contained the usual limitation clause."
8 Appleman, Insurance La"T and Practice 428
(Termination of Policy Protection, Section 5012).
"A notice that a policy 'is hereby cancelled'
'vas construed as being intended to operate aCcording to the ter1ns of the policy at the end of
five days, and \Yas not regarded as being inoperative because given in prac sent£ instead of at the
end of five days." 6 A pple1nan, Insurance La\Y
and Practice 723, ( Ter1nination of Poliey Protection, Section .J-185).
Since the notice effectiYely cancelled the insurance policy
prior to plaintiffs' loss, it is clear that the Court erred in
finding in favor of plaintiffs and sneh finding sl1ould be
reversed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
POINT II
CANAL'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRAN·TED.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
DIAM·OND T UTAH, INC., TO AMEND ITS
PLEADINGS AFTER JUDGl\iEN:T.

The judgment for Diamond T rendered by the
Court against Canal was based upon a theory of estoppel.
Canal and Lloyds had no opportunity to meet this issue
~ince it was never presented until the Court, on its own
1notion at the hearing upon the ~lotion for Ne\v Trial,
granted counsel for Diamond T the privilege of amending
its pleadings to set up the affirmative defense of estoppel.
The issues to be tried and which Canal prepared to
meet as established by the pretrial order were whether
the insurance policy in question was in force at the
time of the damage to plaintiffs' truck and the amount
of such damage (R. 41). At trial the amount of damage
'vas agreed leaving, in the words of eounsel for Diamond
T, "only issue No. 1 in issue at this time." (T. 3).
Then counsel stated its theory on this issue to be that
notice of cancellation was not n1ailed ( T. 5). No estoppel
theory \vas ever advanced at any time. It is funda1nental
that 1ninimum due process requires notice and an opSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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portunity to be heard. The ·Court committed prejudicial
error in refusing the Motion for Ne\v Trial and yet
granting the amendment so as to found the judgment
upon an entirely different theory from that upon which
the case was tried.
In Taylor v. E. M. Royal Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264
P.2d 279 (1953), Justice Henroid, speaking for the Utah
Supreme Court, said:
"It is true -that our new rules should be
'liberally construed' to secure a 'just . . . determination of every action,' but they do not represent a one-way street down "Thich but one
litigant may travel. The rules allow locomotion in
both directions by all interested travelers. They
allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading
and proof to the point \vhere some people have
expressed the opinion that careless legal craftsmanship has been invited rather than discouraged.
Be that as it 1nay, a defendant must be extended
every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case
and to meet an adversary's clai1ns. Also he must
be protected against surprise and be assured equal
opportunity and facility to present and prove
counter-contentions~-else unilateral justice and
injustice \vould result sufficient to raise serious
doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees."
In the ronrurring op1n1on of Justice Crockett, it was
~aid that Rule 5--t- requiring the t~ourt to grant relief
evPn though not de1nanded in the pleadings should not
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be .applied unless the opposing party had a fair opportunity to be apprised of and meet the issues so
prP~ented.

In I\7ational Farnlers Union Prop., & Cas. Co. v.
T1unn pso u, -± Utah 2d 7, 286 P .:2u 249 (1955), Justice
Crockett in a unanimous decision said:

"N ot\Yithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and liberalize procedure, we
n1ust not lose sight of the cardinal principle
that under our system of justice, if an issue is
to be tried and a party's rights concluded with
respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and
an opportunity to meet it. This is recognized in
Rule 15 (b) "\vhich recites that such liberal amendlnents shall be ano,ved if the issue is tried ~by
express or implied consent of the party'".
In !Jilellncr Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 rTtah 2d 2:26, 310
P.2d 517 (1957), Justice Crockett said in questions arisIng co net> rning issues not raised by the pleadings :

" ... the adverse party should be given the
benefit of every doubt, and he must not have been
mislecl or in any "\\,.ay prejudiced by introduction
of ne"\v issues."

lT pon each occasion that evidence concerning thP
payn1ent after notice of cancellation had been mailed.
jretion ,,·as
n1ade ( T. -1-7, -1-R, -H\ 69, 70, 7S, 81, 8~, 102,
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103, 122). It cannot, therefore, be said that Canal allowed
the issue of esoppel to be tried by express or implied
consent. Constitutional due process, fundamental concepts of fairness and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require that a new trial be granted to enable Canal to
meet the issue of estoppel.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING
CERTAIN EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL.

The Court permitted introduction of evidence of
payment after notice of cancellation had been mailed.
Such evidence was not material to any issue before the
Court. It could only be admissible to an issue of reinstatement or estoppel, neither of \Yhich 'Yas raised. This
evidence \Vas admitted over appropriate objections of
counsel (T. 47, 48, 49, 69, 70, 78, 81, 82, 10:2, 103, 1:2:2).
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIEN'T TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF CANAL AND AGAINST
LLOYDS.

On April 7, 1958 Lloyds issued to Canal reinsurance
certificate I\ o. A~f 0165-93 insuring Canal against 75 per
<'Pnt of anY
. loss suffered bY. Canal under its Poliev. Xo.
A-777G5. A reinsuraiH)e certificate is a contrart solely
het \\·Pen t\vo insurauee eo1npanil'S under \Yhich the liabilit~·

of thP r0insurer runs only to the reinsured company.
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The original insured has no interest in such policy. 13
.\pplPinan, Insurance Law and Practice 43+, (Rein~ur
anec, Section 7681).
The detennination of the issue of cancellation bet\Yeen Canal and Diamond T has no bearing on the
eaneellation of Lloyds reinsurance certificate. Lloyds
had no agree1nent 'Yith any other person that it would
not cancel any policy of reinsurance (R. 102). On June
19, 1958 eleven days before the damage to the Dirunond
T tractor, Canal received Lloyd's General Change Endorseinent ""'hich unequivocally cancelled the reinsurance
policy effective May 24, 1958 in the follo,ving language:
"It is agreed that as of the effective date
hereof, the policy is amended in the following
particulars. In consideration of a return premium of $418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax, this
certificate ter1ninated in conjunction with overlaying Canal Policy." (Emphasis added.) (R.
104) .
.\1 though purpo eting to relate to an earlier date, this

cancl\llation by the terms of the reinsurance certificate,
""'as effectivr ten days from issuance. Since it 'yas
actually received more than ten days prior to the accident, there can be no recovery for Canal's loss.
Tt is clear that ·Canal understood that the r0insuranc0
had tenninated. By letter of June G, 1958 Canal ackno"\\"'ledged
rrrcipt of the endorsement and stated:
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"We are in receipt of endorsement which
terminates reinsurance certificate AM 0165-93
for the above risk." (Emphasis added.) (R.l03).
The general change endorsement terminating the
reinsurance used the words "in conjunction with overlaying Canal policy." The only reasonable interpretation which can be placed upon the term "in conjunction with" is that the cancellation of the policy between
Canal and Diamond T was the reason for the cancellation of the Lloyds reinsurance certificate. The interpretation apparently placed by the Court upon this
term was that it meant conditioned upon the effective
cancellation ·of the Diamond T policy. Such an interpretation by the Court is directly contrary to the understanding of both parties, as evidenced by Canal's
acknowledgment that the policy had been terminated.
Even if the Court ""'ere right in this interpretation,
the judgment against Lloyds is in error since the Canal
policy 'vas effectively tenninated. Under the decision of
the court in the claim of Dia1nond T against Canal,
Canal 'yas estopped fron1 asserting such cancellation.
This estoppel ""'as based upon conduct of the agent
of Cnnal and cannot be asserted against Lloyds. Since
thP Canal poliry had been ter1nina ted, under either interpretation of the language of Lloyd's notice, the rein~nrance

'vas cancelled.
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COXCLUSION
Under the evidence and findings of the Court, Canal
is entitled to judgrnent against Dia1nond T as a matter
of lR\V.
Ho\vever, if the Court determines the evidence \vas
sufficient to raise an issue of estoppel, minimum due
proce~s requires that a new trial be granted to give Canal
an opportunity to meet this theory.
In either event, Lloyds as a matter of law is not
liable to Canal since its reinsurance certificate was
effectively cancelled prior to the accident.

Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW

& CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant

701·Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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